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Until 2008, Macedonia was leading the process of EU and NATO integration, and (after Cro-
atia) was the fastest-reforming Western Balkan country. However, since Macedonia’s negotia-
tions on joining the EU and NATO were blocked, in connection with its dispute with Greece, 
the Macedonian government has moved away from a policy of reform towards reinforcing 
its autocratic system and consolidating society behind nationalist slogans. Also the EU, which 
had hitherto been the driving force behind the changes, has due to its internal crises been 
paying little attention to violations of democratic standards in the Republic of Macedonia, 
tensions in relations between the Slavic Macedonians and the Albanian minority (which make 
up over 25% of the population), and the country’s permanent political domestic crises. 
In 2015 a wave of anti-government protests and the publication of recordings of phone taps 
testifying to the state’s effective takeover by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party, as well as armed 
clashes between the police and a group of armed Albanians in Kumanovo, led to an escalation 
of the political crisis and mobilised the government’s opponents. Thanks to the mediation of 
the EU, an agreement was negotiated in July 2015 that was supposed to lead to the democ-
ratisation of the country. This compromise, however, was only a tactical manoeuvre which 
allowed the ruling camp to ease tensions. Moreover, the increase in importance of the Balkan 
migration route meant that Macedonia’s stability began to play an important role in reducing 
migratory pressures on the EU’s boundaries, and the Macedonian government has become an 
important partner for the EU in resolving the crisis. Consequently, the EU’s emphasis on de-
mocratising the system has definitely lessened. At the same time, high frustration and social 
polarisation, in conjunction with an undemocratic system, means that stability is very fragile, 
and periodic escalations in tensions can be expected.  
Consolidation of the ruling camp 
The political scene in the Republic of Macedo-
nia is dominated by four political parties, each 
controlled by powerful party leaders who take 
the key decisions along with a narrow group 
of cronies. The parties are divided along ethnic 
lines, and focus on discrediting their competi-
tors as being unable to defend the interests of 
their own ethnic groups. The right-wing Inter-
nal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation– 
–Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), led by Nikola Gruevski, 
and the opposition Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia (SDSM), under Zoran Zaev, mainly 
represent Slavic Macedonians. The votes of the 
Albanian minority are primarily competed for 
by the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) 
of Ali Ahmeti, and the Democratic Party of Al-
banians (DPA) led by Menduh Thaçi. 
VMRO-DPMNE came to power in 2006, present-
ing itself as a party of young Western-educated 
technocrats. It campaigned under slogans of 
undertaking a radical fight against corruption, 
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and the need for sweeping economic reforms 
and attracting foreign investors, which was 
supposed to overcome the very high unemploy-
ment levels. The VMRO-DPMNE soundly defeat-
ed the SDSM party, which had held power al-
most continuously (except for 1998-2001) since 
Macedonia declared independence in 1991. 
The first years of the rule of Nikola Gruevski, 
who was Prime Minister until January 2016, 
brought about an improvement in the econom-
ic situation, and Macedonia became a leading 
reformer, according to the Doing Business rank-
ings, by introducing pro-business measures. 
Red tape was cut back, which reduced the cost 
of doing business; taxation was simplified by 
introducing a flat tax system; and a number of 
privileges and incentives for foreign investors 
were proposed. The processes of integration 
with NATO and the EU were also significantly 
accelerated; Macedonia was to have been invit-
ed to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, 
and the European Commission recommended 
the opening of accession negotiations in 2009. 
The blocking of the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process due to the dispute with Greece was the 
turning point for VMRO-DPMNE. The party be-
gan to move away from its agenda of moderni-
sation, and replaced it with nationalist slogans 
and the consolidation of its autocratic methods 
of governance. People who questioned Gruevs-
ki’s leadership were excluded from the party; 
power in the state and the party was taken over 
by a narrow group linked to the Prime Minis-
ter (including family members), and Macedonia 
became internationally isolated, coming into 
conflict with all of its neighbours and the EU. 
By taking control of the media and state insti-
tutions, conducting an appropriate econom-
ic policy, and monitoring the voting process, 
VMRO-DPMNE has won all the elections since 
2006. However, social tensions have risen, on 
both ethnic and economic grounds. Despite its 
consistent economic growth, Macedonia re-
mains one of the poorest countries in Europe, 
and the lack of democratic mechanisms for re-
solving conflicts means that tensions can quick-
ly escalate into violent demonstrations and 
clashes with the police. 
The state in the service of the party 
One of VMRO-DPMNE’s tools to consolidate 
power, as has also been noted in the EU’s re-
ports, is the subordination of state institutions 
to the party’s interests1. It fills available pub-
lic positions with its own supporters, whose 
job is to issue favourable decisions and deliver 
a sufficient number of votes in elections. This 
applies to the administration, the police, the 
public prosecutor’s office and the judiciary, all 
of which are used to fight political opponents 
and anyone critical of the government. The 
scale to which state institutions have been sub-
ordinated to a narrow group centred around 
PM Gruevski was highlighted by recordings 
the opposition has issued since February 2015 
of a series of phone calls between members of 
the government, senior government officials, 
journalists, opposition politicians, judges and 
prosecutors (over 20,000 people in total had 
their phones tapped during a period of several 
years). A report from the European Commission 
confirmed that only the Macedonian special 
services2 would have had the opportunity to 
eavesdrop on citizens on such a scale. The re-
1 See: Urgent Reform Priorities, http://ec.europa.eu/en-
largement/news_corner/news/newsfiles/ UR20150619_
urgent_reform_priorities.pdf, The recommendations of 
the Senior Experts’ Group, http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/news_corner/news/newsfiles/ UR20150619_rec-
ommendations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf
2 The head of the Security and Counterintelligence Agen-
cy until 2015 was Sasho Miyalkov, a cousin of the Prime 
Minister.
VMRO-DPMNE’s tool to consolidate 
power, as has also been noted in the EU 
reports, is the subordination of state in-
stitutions to the party’s interests.
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cordings indicate that not only were the oppo-
sition and journalists placed under surveillance, 
but also members of the ruling party itself. The 
state institutions’ reaction to the phone-tap-
ping scandal was typical; the public prosecu-
tor’s office initiated an investigation into the 
matter, but only against opposition represen-
tatives, on charges of disclosing documents or 
committing espionage, rather than on the nu-
merous irregularities relating to the phone tap-
ping or the surveillance itself. The media have 
hardly reported on this scandal at all. 
Economic policy as a method  
of buying votes
In the period 2006-2015, Macedonia grew at 
a good, medium-paced level of 2.9% per year3. 
The accumulated foreign investment totalled 
US$5.1 billion in 2014, which is comparable to 
countries such as Albania or Bosnia and Herze-
govina (mainly thanks to the low cost of labour). 
Macedonia used to be the poorest republic of 
the former Yugoslavia, a fact which still influ-
ences overall standards of living: despite its sta-
ble growth, it remains one of the poorest coun-
tries in Europe, with per capita GDP in 2014 of 
37% of the EU average, according to PPP4. The 
rate of unemployment is one of the highest 
in Europe, at 28%. Since 2009-2010 economic 
growth has been stimulated above all by public 
sector investment and an increase in domestic 
3 For comparison, in this period Albania posted growth of 
3.8%, and Serbia 1.8%.
4 Data from Eurostat in 2014.
demand, which has been achieved thanks to 
increases in pensions and subsidies, as well as 
in wages and employment in the public sector. 
These expenses are linked to the dynamic rise 
in public debt, from 24.1% of GDP in 2010 to 
38.2% in 2015. 
Meanwhile the private sector is underdevel-
oped, and often depends on the support of 
the government (monopolies) or government 
contracts. The size of hidden economy is esti-
mated at between 24 and 47% of its GDP5. Tax 
avoidance by companies belonging to persons 
associated with the ruling elite is common6, of-
ten in exchange for their financial support of 
the government. Businessmen are also forced 
to finance investment supported by the govern-
ment (such as churches), and there is no legal 
protection for private property and business 
activity (except for foreign companies, which 
are important for exports). 
The rise in employment in the public sector 
has reduced unemployment, while at the same 
time the party has gained an instrument to 
wield significant influence on society by decid-
ing whom to allot vacant posts to. According to 
official data, of over 690,000 employed people, 
126,000 (18%) work in the state administration. 
This number seems to be a significant underes-
timate (for example, some people working on 
civil law contracts are not taken into account 
in the statistics), and the actual number of per-
sons working in the administration may even 
exceed 40% of the total number in work7 (the 
average for OECD countries, together with 
employees of state enterprises, is 21%). Thou-
sands of people work in businesses owned by 
oligarchs linked to the government. Another 
important way in which VMRO-DPMNE has 
built up its popularity is the system of subsidies 
5 Monitoring of the hidden economy in Macedonia: 
Trends and policy options, pasos.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/10/Monitoring-Report_ENG.pdf, p. 9. 
6 Ibid., p. 61.
7 K. Bassuener, No Stability without Accountability – The 
West’s Responsibility in Macedonia, Sarajevo 2015, p. 6.
The rise in employment in the public sec-
tor has reduced unemployment, while at 
the same time the party has gained an in-
strument to wield significant influence on 
society.
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for agriculture introduced in 2007; these had 
previously been merely symbolic, but in 2015 
they amounted to €150 million. These have not 
produced a significant increase in agricultural 
production; they are only social transfers and 
a tool to build up support among the elector-
ate. Furthermore, the investment projects are 
actually being implemented just to achieve 
short-term objectives (increasing employment, 
rewarding favourably-inclined businessmen8) 
rather than to lay the foundations for long-term 
growth, including the development of innova-
tive sectors of the economy. One example is the 
flagship Skopje 2014 project (estimated to cost 
around €634 million9), which has been carried 
out since 2010, mainly in the centre of the cap-
ital. In comparison, for the road investment in 
the period 2006-2015 it was allocated a total of 
€166 million10. Meanwhile, the insufficient de-
velopment of road infrastructure, just like the 
energy grid and the railways, constitutes a ma-
jor barrier to further growth11. 
Media subjugated to the government
The fundamental reform of the media sector is 
one of the main conditions for holding demo-
cratic elections in the Republic of Macedonia, 
which in just four years has dropped 84 places 
in the World Press Freedom rankings, coming 
123rd in 201412. Reports from both the OSCE and 
the EU refer to the significant influence of the 
ruling elites on the Macedonian media, which 
8 For example, contracts constituting 33.1% of the Skopje 
2014’s entire value went to the DG Beton Skopje compa-
ny, whose owner Mincho Yordanov also has a stake in 
the newspaper Nova Makedoniya.
9 The costs of the project during its implementation have 
risen eightfold to €634 million, which represents around 
22% of total annual budget expenditure. Detailed infor-
mation about the project and its financing is available at 
http://skopje2014.prisma.birn.eu.com/en
10 In Macedonia is invested in road and rail infrastructure as 
never before, http://kurir.mk/en/?p=49143
11 Macedonia came 91st out of 144 countries according to the 
Global Competiveness Report. World Bank Group: FYR Mace-
donia Partnership Country Snapshot, October 2015, p. 9.
12 The 2014 World Press Freedom Index, URhttp://rsf.org/
index2014/en-index2014.php
are mostly owned by people closely connected 
to the ruling camp; in addition, the government 
earmarks around 1% of GDP on campaigns 
in the media which support it. All four main 
Macedonian newspapers, as well as the most 
popular TV channels (TV Sitel, Kanal 5, Alpha, 
and the Albanian-language Alsat-M) are owned 
by businessmen linked to VMRO-DPMNE. 
Media and journalists critical of the govern-
ment are not only deprived of advertising con-
tracts from the government, the public sector 
and businesses related to the ruling camp, but 
are also the targets of active hostility. The gov-
ernment uses administrative and penal-fiscal 
means to this end. In 2011, three newspapers 
(the daily Vreme, the tabloid Shpits, the Alba-
nian-language Koha e Re) and  the most pop-
ular TV station in the country, A1, were closed 
, which belong to the Plus Produkcja media 
company owned by Velija Ramkovski, who was 
arrested in connection with accusations of tax 
offences and money laundering. A similar sce-
nario was applied in the case of the Telma TV 
station, which first was subjected to significant 
fines, and then in August 2015 its owners were 
arrested. Another tool for putting pressure on 
the media is the use of trials targeted direct-
ly at journalists, who have been sentenced to 
heavy fines and jail time. There have also been 
attempts at intimidation and beatings. Conse-
quently, critical information about the govern-
ment’s activities is only available to a narrow 
group of people, and most of the public only 
hear pro-government propaganda. 
The media sector is controlled by people 
close to the governing elites, and journalists 
critical of the Government are also the tar-
gets of active hostility.
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The national revival programme
An important aspect of VMRO-DPMNE’s poli-
cy of the consolidation of power is its appeal 
to nationalist ideology and strengthening the 
Macedonian national identity, constructed on 
the basis of ancient tradition (Alexander the 
Great) and Orthodox culture, but in opposition 
to that of the neighbouring countries (Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia). The policy of strengthen-
ing Macedonian identity is addressed exclusive-
ly to Slavic Macedonians, who make up around 
60% of the population, and disregards the her-
itage and traditions of the national minorities, 
the largest of which is the ethnic Albanians. 
This policy deepens social antagonisms, but 
allows the ethnic Macedonians to consolidate 
around the ruling party, while strengthening 
their sense of threat by neighbouring states 
and minorities. Such rhetoric is deployed espe-
cially before the elections, and is accompanied 
by actions intended to deliberately provoke the 
minorities to radical actions, in order to distract 
from the failures of the government’s policy13 
and discredit its political opponents, partic-
ularly the SDSM, who have been described as 
‘traitors to the nation’ due to their less confron-
tational rhetoric in relation to Greece and the 
minorities. These measures are accepted by the 
13 One example of such activities is a matter of the murder 
of five ethnic Macedonians in 2012 and the investiga-
tion and trial in this case, code-named ‘Monster’, which 
caused a number of protests by ethnic Albanians until 
the verdict. Statements by the Interior Minister, who 
had already accused radical Islamists of this crime at an 
early stage of the investigation, stoked the civic tensions 
and the subsequent ethnic minority protests. The trial 
of the six Albanians was not transparent, which further 
strengthened their suspicions that there was insufficient 
evidence of the accused parties’ guilt.
ruling party’s Albanian coalition partner, which 
in exchange for admission to the government is 
supposed to keep the tension among Albanians 
at a level which does not threaten the stability 
of the state. 
Domestically, a key manifestation of this policy 
is the above-mentioned Skopje 2014 project, 
which involves the construction of more than 
150 buildings and monuments highlighting the 
ancient roots of the Macedonians, their medi-
eval history and their Orthodox heritage. The 
project has been accompanied by education-
al and cultural programmes. Protests by the 
Albanian minority have led to the inclusion in 
the project of three memorials commemorat-
ing important personalities of Albanian origin, 
but these have not yet been built. In terms of 
foreign policy, this attitude is expressed mainly 
in the government’s uncompromising position 
in its negotiations with Greece, as well as dis-
putes in the interpretation of the history with 
Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent with Serbia. 
Most recently, tensions have also arisen more 
frequently in relations with Albania and Koso-
vo in connection with the VMRO-DPMNE policy 
towards ethnic Albanians. 
Albanians form a parallel society 
Since its declaration of independence, Mace-
donia has been constructed as a state for Slav 
Macedonians14, who predominated in the ad-
ministration and the state’s security sector. The 
fact that Albanian parties have participated in 
government coalitions had not led to any im-
provement in the minority’s position in the 
country, which resulted in the clashes between 
Albanian guerrillas (the National Liberation 
Army or UÇK) and the army and police in 2001. 
EU and US mediation prevented the escalation 
14 The preamble to the 1991 Constitution of the Republic 
of Macedonia was significant, as it stated that Macedo-
nia was the state of the Macedonian people, who guar-
antee equal rights for minorities; compare the Commu-
nist version, which stated that Macedonia is a republic 
of Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, etc.
The nationalist ideology has consolidated 
the Macedonians around the ruling party, 
while strengthening their sense of threat 
by neighbouring states and minorities.
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of the crisis and led to the signing of the Ohrid 
Agreement in 2001, which guaranteed a num-
ber of rights to the Albanian minority. These in-
cluded the extension of the use of the Albanian 
language in government and education (includ-
ing the opening of a university), proportional 
representation in administration, the require-
ment of a double majority on issues important 
to minorities, and the decentralisation of the 
state. The agreement was broadly accepted 
by the ethnic Albanians (90% fully or partial-
ly endorsed it), but it was and continues to be 
challenged by the Macedonians (55% do not 
support the agreement, in whole or in part)15.
The Ohrid Agreement was supposed to guar-
antee the construction of a multi-ethnic state, 
but it has in fact become the basis for the con-
struction of two parallel societies, each with 
their own institutions, political parties, me-
dia and separate education systems. The VM-
RO-DPMNE’s methods of consolidating power 
at the level of the entire state have been copied 
by its coalition partner, the DUI, with regard to 
the Albanian minority. This party, which has its 
roots in the UÇK, owes its position to the as-
signment of administrative posts reserved for 
minorities, control of the Albanian-language 
media, and its networks of clients. Officially the 
party declares itself to be the defender of Alba-
nian interests, but in practice it draws tangible 
benefits from its joint rule of the state, and ac-
cepts the anti-Albanian rhetoric of its coalition 
partner. Both the ruling parties use the same 
15 According to a study from 2003 by R. Peshkopi, Condi-
tioning Democratisation: Institutional Reforms and EU 
Membership Conditionality in Macedonia and Albania, 
London 2014, p. 71.
methods – exploiting mutual concerns and fo-
menting ethnic stereotypes – to consolidate 
their electorates. Tensions are also deepened 
by VMRO-DPMNE’s rhetoric of fighting against 
radical Islam, for which it blames the Muslim 
Albanian minority, and which it uses to justify 
police actions against them. This also legitimis-
es its authority on the international stage as an 
ally in the fight against terrorism. In this regard, 
the government’s policy actually contributes to 
radicalising the minorities, and the measures it 
takes serve more to consolidate public support 
than to combat real threats. VMRO-DPMNE’s 
strategy of excluding the Albanians increasingly 
prevents them from identifying with the com-
mon state or its foreign policy (the Albanians 
favour rapid integration with the EU and NATO, 
even at the expense of a change to the name of 
the state, which the majority of Macedonians 
reject). The policy of the government in Sko-
pje, which the Albanians do not trust, means 
that minor incidents can easily grow into mass 
demonstrations. The Albanian minority is not 
currently ready to undertake military action 
against the government, but the leader of the 
DUI is finding it harder to control the mood, 
and his leadership has been challenged, which 
has been shown by divisions within the party 
and a number of incidents targeting its repre-
sentatives (beatings and even murders). 
Weak opposition 
For the majority of society, the main problems 
are economic issues: unemployment, poverty 
and low salaries16. Most of the public has no 
confidence in the state institutions (66% do not 
trust the judicial system, and 64% distrust the 
government)17. However, this social frustration 
16 IRI’s Center for Insights Poll: Citizens Uncertain about 
Implementation of the Przino Agreement, Worried 
about Macedonia’s Fragile Stability, http://www.iri.
org/resource/iri%E2%80%99s-center-insights-poll-cit-
izens-uncertain-about-implementation-przino-agree-
ment-worried
17 Ibid.
VMRO-DPMNE’s strategy of excluding 
the Albanians increasingly prevents them 
from identifying with the common state or 
its foreign policy.
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has not translated into support for the opposi-
tion. This is due not only to the autocratic sys-
tem and the intimidation of the population (81% 
of Macedonians are afraid of the consequences 
of expressing their own opinion18), but also to 
the lack of credibility of the opposition, and in 
particular the SDSM, which during its time in 
government laid the foundations for the pres-
ent system based on corruption and nepotism. 
In this party, as in the ruling party, the elites 
have rarely been replaced, and the government 
of its long-time leader from Branko Crvenkovski 
(1992-1998), were linked to an opaque privati-
sation process and led to the emergence of the 
group of oligarchs which controled the state19.
Zoran Zaev, a young local activist who has been 
the party’s leader since 2013, has proved un-
able to provide an attractive alternative to the 
current elite. The opposition has  limited itself 
to boycotting parliament in order to push for 
early elections. Both the phone-tapping scan-
dal, preceded by a backstage blackmail of the 
government, and the leaks about the contents 
of recordings which have not yet been pub-
lished, indicate that Zaev has been more inter-
ested in taking a share of power than democ-
ratising the system. For this reason, the SDSM 
has been unable to create a protest movement 
along with civil organisations. Concern that 
the opposition will apply the same methods 
of the governance when it wins as the ruling 
18 H. Grabbe, The deep roots of Macedonia’s current turmoil – 
and the way forward, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/heather-grabbe’s/deep-roots-of-Mace-
donia’s-current-turmoil-% E2% 80% 93-and-way-forward
19 Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the 
Country Down, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/eu-
rope/Macedonia%2015.pdf
party does now has also consolidated the ben-
eficiaries of the current system. Macedonian 
society is also   characterised by a high degree 
of acceptance of strong leadership, as well as 
a lack of ingrained democratic mechanisms. The 
most active people choose to emigrate; accord-
ing to Gallup’s estimates over 300,000 people20 
(15% of the population) have left Macedonia. 
The migration crisis breaks through  
Macedonia’s isolation
There is a consensus among Macedonia’s politi-
cal elite that membership in Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures remains the country’s strategic goal, and 
that a pro-Western orientation is the corner-
stone of foreign policy. At the same time, how-
ever, there is a perception among the Macedo-
nian people, fuelled by the party in power, that 
the West, and above all the EU, have repeatedly 
betrayed Macedonia: first, when the EU did not 
recognise the country’s independence in 1991 
because of the dispute with Greece; secondly in 
2001, when the EU forced the political elites to 
conclude the controversial agreement with the 
Albanian minority in Ohrid; and thirdly in 2008, 
when it allowed Greece to block Macedonia’s 
membership in NATO and the EU, despite fa-
vourable decisions by international tribunals21. 
In addition, the states which are seen as pos-
ing a threat to Macedonian sovereignty and 
national identity – Greece and Bulgaria – are 
members of both the EU and NATO. This ten-
sion is regularly exploited in VMRO-DPMNE’s 
rhetoric, and means that European integration 
is increasingly linked to an abdication of nation-
al identity. Consequently, although support for 
European integration is very high in Macedo-
nia, only 26% of the population supports ac-
cession to the EU unconditionally (particularly 
the Albanian population), and 63% support it 
20 Grabbe, op.cit.
21 In 2011, the International Court of Justice found that 
Greece’s opposition to the Republic of Macedonia’s ap-
plication to join NATO in 2008 had violated an agree-
ment between those two countries in 1995.
There is a perception among the Macedo-
nian people, fuelled by the party in power, 
that the West, and above all the EU, have 
repeatedly betrayed Macedonia.
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only if membership not be associated with the 
need to change the name of the state. More-
over, 59% of the population consider that the 
lack of progress in the negotiations is due to 
their blocking by Greece, and 51% think that 
Macedonia is ready for membership. This sit-
uation is very favourable to the ruling party, 
because it means that VMRO-DPMNE does not 
have to implement the reforms required by the 
EU, which would affect the power system and 
the position of the ruling camp in Macedonia. 
A turning point has arrived with the migration 
crisis. As Macedonia drowns in internal disputes, 
it has become a major transit country for mi-
grants trying to reach Western Europe, primarily 
Germany, from Greece via the Balkans. Greece’s 
policy of sending the migrants on to neighbour-
ing states has led to Macedonia, which is not 
a member of the EU, becoming an important 
partner in efforts to block the influx of migrants 
into the EU. This has strengthened the ruling 
elite’s position and discouraged support for 
democratic experiments, as the process of dem-
ocratic transformation may be accompanied by 
a weakening of state institutions and the esca-
lation of internal tensions, which would reduce 
Macedonia’s ability to protect the border. 
A missed opportunity  
for democratisation
In 2015, after Macedonia was swept by a wave 
of demonstrations by various social groups, 
and bloody clashes broke out in Kumanovo, 
the so-called Przhino agreement was signed, 
under pressure from the EU22. This was intend-
ed to weaken the ruling party’s influence over 
the state institutions and create conditions to 
hold genuinely democratic elections, which 
were scheduled for 24 April 2016. The SDSM 
have returned to parliament, its representatives 
should have been included in the government, 
and Nikola Gruevski was to have resigned 100 
days before the elections. Moreover, the Special 
Prosecutor was supposed to have investigated 
the irregularities revealed in the overheard re-
cordings. 
These conditions were in fact met, but in fact 
VMRO-DPMNE, with its network of loyal sup-
porters, was able to prevent the actions intend-
ed to weaken its influence and to block the 
implementation of the settlement. The media 
laws have not been changed, nor has the voter 
list been verified in accordance with the recom-
mendations by the OSCE. The media still clear-
ly favour the ruling party, and the unreliable 
list of voters makes electoral fraud easy23. The 
negotiations with the opposition, the govern-
ment’s agreement to early elections, and the 
resignation of three of the most controversial 
ministers have allowed VMRO-DPMNE to calm 
social discontent, discourage further protests 
and demobilise supporters of a change of 
government. According to polls conducted at 
the turn of February, which give it 25% of the 
vote, the government has succeeded; only 13% 
of those surveyed would vote for the SDSM24. 
At the same time, over 50% of the popula-
tion refuses to declare its political preferences. 
VMRO-DPMNE is determined to confirm its 
dominance in the upcoming elections. Only by 
22 From the name of the street where the EU delegation 
was staying. The agreement was concluded on 2 June, 
and was modified on 15 July 2015; Agreement in Sko-
pje to overcome political crisis, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agree-
ment-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en
23 Although the population of the Republic of Macedonia 
stands at 2,065,000, the register of voters contains up 
to 1,780,000, including many people resident at the 
same address, which suggests that there are many so-
called ‘dead souls’ on the electoral rolls.
24 The DUI enjoys the support of 8.5% of the electorate, 
and the DPA 3.4%.
The EU’s policy towards the crisis in 
Macedonia has undermined the credibil-
ity of Brussels as an actor which attach-
es great importance to compliance with 
democratic standards.
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maintaining the status quo will it ensure its im-
punity and keep the ruling elites in power, even 
at the cost of – in their opinion – a temporary 
risk to the stability of the state which could be 
posed by reignited ethnic tensions. In February, 
the EU and the US demanded that the elections 
be postponed to 5 June this year, arguing that 
more time is needed to ensure democratic stan-
dards. This will only prolong the period of un-
certainty, because the West is not interested in 
making an active and long-term commitment 
to the transformation of Macedonia, and the 
migration crisis has definitely weakened the 
pressure on the Skopje government to meet the 
conditions for democratising the system. 
The EU’s policy towards the crisis in Macedonia 
has undermined the credibility of Brussels as an 
actor which attaches great importance to com-
pliance with long-term stability and democratic 
standards. Instead of a comprehensive solution 
to Macedonia’s problems, which would also 
involve negotiations with Greece and unblock-
ing the process of EU integration, Brussels’ rep-
resentatives have worked towards arranging 
a rapid agreement, the implementation of 
which has been questionable from the begin-
ning, and where the chances of democratising 
the political system are not great. In addition, 
the EU’s cooperation with the government in 
Skopje on the migration question would legit-
imise the undemocratic VMRO-DPMNE gov-
ernment, thus weakening the position of the 
opposition and civil society. Macedonia’s struc-
tural problems will be further deepened, and 
social and ethnic tensions will continue to pose 
a threat to the stability of the state. 
